Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
10-2013

The Latest Red River Rivalry: The Supreme Court's Recent
Decision Regarding the Red River Compact
Luke W. Davis
Gabriel Eckstein
Texas A&M University School of Law, gabrieleckstein@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Science and Technology
Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States
Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke W. Davis & Gabriel Eckstein, The Latest Red River Rivalry: The Supreme Court's Recent Decision
Regarding the Red River Compact, 1 Tex. A&M Law. 6 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1509

This Magazine Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For
more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

The Latest
Red River Rivalry:
The Supreme Court’s Recent Decision
Regarding the Red River Compact
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A through and deck truss bridge originally built by the St. Louis
& San Francisco Railroad spans Oklahoma’s Kiamichi River
just south of the Hugo Reservoir Dam in Reach II, subbasin 5.
– Photo by Dan Brothers

On June 13, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous
decision in a “Red River Rivalry” with much greater implications than
the annual football game. In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann,
the court sided entirely with Oklahoma in that state’s dispute with Texas
over the allocation of Red River water. This decision will have considerable
impact on Texas’ ability to meet its ever-growing water needs. Moreover,
the decision could be consequential for other interstate water compacts and
the states relying on the rivers and tributaries governed by those agreements.

I. Background

II. Interstate Compacts

he Tarrant Regional Water District (“Tarrant”) is a statesanctioned entity and water district responsible for
providing water to north-central Texas (including the
cities of Fort Worth, Arlington and Mansfield). Starting in 2000,
with permission from Texas state government, Tarrant began
exploring options to obtain and divert Texas’ entitled share of
water allocated under the Red River Compact (“RRC”) from an
Oklahoma tributary of the Red River, the Kiamichi River.1 Tarrant
sought to withdraw this water from Oklahoma’s Kiamichi River,
before the water entered the Red River since water in the Red
River is saline and requires significant desalination to make it
potable.2 In contrast, Kiamichi River water is suitable for domestic
and industrial use and would not require refining before use.

Interstate compacts are agreements between two or more
states often used to allocate transboundary waters and
coordinate flood and pollution prevention measures. The
Compact Clause of the United States Constitution grants
states the authority to enter into these agreements so long
as they begin negotiations with congressional approval and
subsequently seek congressional ratification.3 Once a compact
is signed by the compacting states and ratified by Congress,
the compact becomes federal law.

T

1. Red River Compact 4
The RRC was crafted to allocate water from the Red River and
its tributaries among the four signatory states. Its purpose is
to promote relationships and remove causes of controversy
while providing an equitable apportionment of the water. While
negotiations over the RRC began in 1955, it wasn’t signed until
1978 and then approved by Congress in 1980.

While Oklahoma conceded that Texas is entitled to a share
of water under the RRC — which apportions the Red River’s
waters among Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas —
Oklahoma rejected Tarrant’s efforts and barred the entity from
carrying out its plan. It contended that Texas and its entities
are not allowed to reach into Oklahoma territory to obtain
Texas’ water. Oklahoma claimed its sovereignty, language
of the RRC, state laws not preempted by the RRC, and its
right to discriminate against out-of-state water users prevent
Texas from diverting water from within Oklahoma. According
to Oklahoma, Texas can only appropriate its water once it
reaches Texas.

The RRC divides the Red River Basin into five major territories
(each called a “Reach”) and further divides these Reaches
into topographical subbasins, with each Reach and subbasin
allocating water differently. Article V of the RRC governs
allocation from Reach II, subbasin 5, which includes the
Kiamichi River. Under Article V:
“Signatory States shall have equal rights to
the use of runoff originating in subbasin 5 and
undesignated water flowing into subbasin 5, so
long as the flow of the Red River at the ArkansasLouisiana state boundary is 3,000 cubic feet per
second or more, provided no state is entitled to
more than 25 percent of the water in excess of
3,000 cubic feet per second.”5

As a result, in 2007, Tarrant sued Oklahoma disputing the
Sooner state’s interpretation of the RRC. At the heart of the
dispute was the interpretation of § 5.05(b) of the compact
focusing on water allocation in Reach II, subbasin 5, which
encompasses the Red River and its tributaries, including the
Kiamichi River, from Denison Dam (impounding Lake Texoma)
to the Arkansas-Louisiana state border.
8

Even though each state has an equal right to use the water in
subbasin 5, the majority of this water is physically located within
Oklahoma and none in Louisiana.6 Furthermore, as Tarrant
noted in its petition for writ of certiorari, “Texas does not have
access to its full apportionment of subbasin 5 water from within
its borders.”7

from issuing Tarrant a permit. In particular, Tarrant argued that
Oklahoma’s laws were preempted by the RRC and that they
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by restricting interstate
commerce.11 As the suit commenced, the parties stipulated that
OWRB would take no official action on the permit applications
until the litigation was concluded.12

2. Parties and the Underlying Lawsuit

At the Oklahoma District Court, Tarrant sought declaratory
judgment and an injunction prohibiting OWRB from enforcing
statutes preventing Tarrant from receiving its share of RRCallotted water.13 The court, however, granted OWRB’s summary
judgment on all of Tarrant’s claims.14

Tarrant supplies water to almost two million people in the Fort
Worth area. By 2060, the district’s water demand is projected
to exceed supply by roughly 400,000 acre-feet.8 To alleviate the
growing water demand, Tarrant needs the compacted water.
In 2007, Tarrant filed a permit application with the Oklahoma
Water Resource Board (“OWRB” or “Oklahoma”) to divert and
use approximately 310,000 acre-feet per year from the Kiamichi
River in Reach II, subbasin 5.9 OWRB is the Oklahoma agency
charged with administering the use, quality and permitting of
groundwater and surface water in Oklahoma.10
Knowing that the OWRB intended to reject their application,
Tarrant simultaneously sued OWRB alleging that various
Oklahoma statutes unjustifiably and unlawfully prevented OWRB

On Sept. 7, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court decision.15 The Tenth Circuit held that the language
of the RRC provided clear statements that Congress authorized
the compacting states to regulate water within its state, even if
by discriminatory laws favoring in-state users.16 The court also
rejected Tarrant’s preemption arguments, holding that the equal
rights of the states to use water in subbasin 5 did not give Texas
the right to take water from within Oklahoma.17 Concerned
about the implications this ruling would have on its ability to
supply North Texans with much needed water, Tarrant appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Graphic courtesy of the Oklahoma Water Resource Board.
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3. Solicitor General’s Review
In an uncommon move for the Supreme Court, before accepting
the petition for certiorari, the justices asked the solicitor general
of the United States to file a brief expressing the views of the United
States. Urging the court to accept Tarrant’s appeal, the solicitor
suggested that whether Tarrant can obtain water from within
Oklahoma depends on the interpretation and preemptive effects
of the RRC.18 The solicitor contended that compacts should be
interpreted and read as contracts; under his interpretation of
the RRC, Texas should be allowed to appropriate water from
within Oklahoma. Additionally, the solicitor asserted that the
dispute dealt only with RRC interpretation and preemption and
that the court need not address any Commerce Clause issues.19

III. The Arguments and the
Court’s Decision
The arguments presented before the Supreme Court mostly
revolve around, and begin with, the language and interpretation
of the RRC. The three main questions that the parties
presented included: 1) what is the plain and clear meaning of
the phrase “equal rights to the use of” as used in § 5.05(b)(1);
2) whether the RRC preempts state laws; and 3) whether the
RRC language gave congressional permission for a state to
discriminate with water.

1. Language of the RRC
The contention behind this rivalry is how water in Reach II,
subbasin 5, should be allocated when the RRC provides that
each state has an “equal right to the use of” the subbasin
water. The interpretation, intent and effect of this language
are important for the subsequent preemption and Commerce
Clause issues. In determining the meaning of this language,
both parties looked to other sections of the RRC.20
Both parties agreed that a compact is a contract and
should be interpreted as one, and like a statute, should be
interpreted by its plain terms. Tarrant argued that the RRC’s
language regarding water allocation in subbasin 5 is clear and
unambiguous, and that the plain terms gave each state 25
percent of excess runoff water in this subbasin regardless of
state boundaries.
Tarrant further argued that § 5.05(b) placed no geographical
restrictions on the states in obtaining their 25 percent share of
water, in contrast to other sections of the RRC that specifically
and expressly limit where a state can obtain its water.21
Moreover, Tarrant contended that OWRB and the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretation of the RCC (that states can only obtain water
from within their border) is incorrect because Louisiana would
never get any of its allocated water since subbasin 5 water is
situated entirely outside of Louisiana’s territory.22
In response, OWRB contended that had the parties and
Congress so intended, the RRC would have explicitly declared

that one state may enter another state’s territory to obtain its
share of water; they also argued that where other compacts
have allowed such incursion, they have always done so with
specificity.23 Oklahoma believed that the “equal right to use”
language simply means a state is allocated 25 percent of
the excess water to use and divert within its own state.24
Accordingly, Oklahoma argued that because the RRC language
does not expressly authorize Texas to enter Oklahoma, and
Texas did not bargain for this right in negotiating the RRC, the
RRC only allows a state to use its equal share appropriated
within its own border.25
Siding with Oklahoma, the Supreme Court interpreted the
RRC’s language to mean that Texas was not permitted to
enter into Oklahoma territory to obtain its water allotment. In
reaching its decision, it stated that:
“Three things persuade us that cross-border
rights were not granted by the Compact: the wellestablished principle that States do not easily
cede their sovereign powers, including their
control over waters within their own territories;
the fact that other interstate water compacts
have treated cross-border rights explicitly; and
the parties’ course of dealing.”26
The Court further reasoned that § 5.05(b) of the RRC did
not provide Texas with a guarantee of a minimum amount of
water. Rather, it said that amount provided in the provision —
25 percent of the water in excess of 3,000 cubic feet per
second — serves as a ceiling. Moreover, it asserted that if
Texas believed it was not getting its fair share of the excess
water, its sole remedy was to seek an accounting as provided
under § 2.11 of the RRC, and based on that accounting,
demand that Oklahoma desist from taking more than its share.

2. RRC and the Preemption of State Laws
Tarrant also contended that Oklahoma violated sections
of the RRC by enforcing laws that are “inconsistent” with
the compact, namely, statutes that prohibited Texas from
withdrawing water from within Oklahoma and transporting
it to Texas. It also argued, as did the solicitor general, that
the “presumption against preemption” should not apply.
Normally, when federal law is forced upon a state, there is a
presumption that the federal law does not preempt state law.
However, when a state voluntarily consents and enters into a
compact allocating natural resources, Tarrant asserted that
the presumption should not apply.27 Therefore, according to
Tarrant, any Oklahoma statute preventing Texas from obtaining
its water should be deemed preempted by the RRC.
The basis of Tarrant’s claim, however, was grounded on
its belief that it was entitled to a certain quantity of water
from subbasin 5. Given that the Court had dismissed this
interpretation of the RRC and ruled that the compact does not
create any cross-border rights, the Court rejected Tarrant’s
preemption analysis outright.
10

Graphic courtesy of Tarrant Regional Water District.

3. The Right to Discriminate Against
Interstate Commerce
Finally, the Supreme Court was also asked
to address whether clear congressional
consent was given to the signatory states
to pass and enforce discriminatory laws
burdening interstate commerce. This
required consideration of the “equal rights”
language and other sections in the RRC
providing that compact obligations shall
not interfere with a state’s appropriation,
control, and use of water that is not
inconsistent with the compact.
Tarrant argued that certain Oklahoma
statutes are discriminatory and have
effectively resulted in an embargo
on out-of-state water transactions.28
According to Tarrant, for a state to favor
its own citizens and discriminate against
citizens of other states, a compact
must include a clear statement showing
Congress’ “clear and unambiguous
intent” to permit the use of protectionist
and discriminatory laws, which would
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.
In addition, Tarrant asserted that
the Supreme Court’s Sporhase case
addressed this issue when the Court
struck down similar Nebraska laws that

prohibited out-of-state groundwater
transfers.29 In Sporhase, the Court
said that Nebraska’s reliance on broad
statutory language and interstate
compacts, containing language similar
to that used in the RRC, did not evidence
clear congressional intent to remove
the federal constraints on such state
laws.30 Tarrant argued that the scattered
language in the RRC does not show the
clear and unambiguous intent required for
a state to pass and enforce protectionist
laws favoring its own citizens.
In response, Oklahoma contended that
Sporhase is distinguishable because
it addressed groundwater rather than
surface waters, and that there had not
been an interstate compact allocating
the groundwater at issue in that case.
Furthermore, Oklahoma argued that
the Tenth Circuit correctly found the
required clear congressional intent
for Oklahoma’s water embargo in four
provisions of the RRC.31 Accordingly,
Oklahoma contended that because
Congress adopted the RRC as federal
law, the RRC explicitly carves out an
exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause and allows states to pass laws
protecting and favoring its citizens.
11

In considering Tarrant’s contentions,
the Supreme Court again referred to
its conclusion that § 5.05(b) of the RRC
does not afford Texas a guaranteed
volume of water. Accordingly, because
Texas is not entitled to water from
within Oklahoma, it has not suffered any
discrimination as an out-of-state user
participating in interstate commerce.
The Court asserted that under §
5.05(b), all water exceeding Oklahoma’s
25 percent share in excess of the 3,000
CFS base amount is allotted to Oklahoma
“unless and until another state calls for
an accounting and Oklahoma is asked
to refrain from utilizing more than its
entitled share.” In effect, discrimination
against Texas could only be proven
through an accounting showing that
Oklahoma used more than its allotment
of the excess water and that Texas
was somehow prevented from using
its share of that excess water. In the
absence of an accounting and evidence
of discrimination, the Court deemed
Tarrant’s claim without merit.

IV. Implications of the
Court’s Decision
The consequences of the Court’s
decision are not insignificant. For the
Tarrant Regional Water District as well as
for the whole of Texas, the outcome will
make it more difficult to enjoy and utilize
water allotted to the state under the RRC.
While Texas does have rights to excess
water in subbasin 5 (as well as rights to
Red River water from other subbasins),
it will have to obtain its allotment from
the more salty Red River rather than
from fresher tributaries flowing within
Oklahoma. The cost of desalinating that
water now will be one of the challenges
that Tarrant will have to evaluate when
considering whether to use Red River
water as a source of potable water.
Related to this challenge, and an issue
left unsettled by the Court, is the
manner in which Texas would access its
share of excess water from subbasin 5.
Under agreements predating the RRC,
Oklahoma actually “owns” both banks
of the Red River up to the vegetation

feature
story

Graphic courtesy of Tarrant Regional Water District.

line on the river’s southern shore. Since, under this decision,
Texas may not enter Oklahoma to obtain its share of subbasin
5 water without Oklahoma’s consent, it is unclear how Texas
would access its water allotment.
From a broader perspective, the decision has likely raised
the barrier for future challenges to interstate compacts by
compact members seeking access to cross-border water
resources. In ruling for Oklahoma, the Court’s decision
suggests a presumption that expectations in property
interests established under interstate water compacts are
“reasonable” ones that should be protected. In a prior case, the
Supreme Court stated, “We have recognized the importance of
honoring reasonable expectations in property interests. But
such expectations can only be of consequence where they
are ‘reasonable’ ones.”32 Given the scope of property rights
created by interstate compacts and related state water laws,
the presumption of reasonableness will be a daunting hurdle
to overcome and could have serious consequences for other
interstate compact challenges, including Texas’ recently filed
Supreme Court case against New Mexico over the 1938 Rio
Grande Compact.

In the final analysis, the most important lesson resulting from
the Red River Rivalry may not be found in the Court’s opinion.
Rather, it is likely located in the Court’s nearly century-old
admonition that state riparians to interstate waters, whether or
not governed by an interstate compact, should always look to
cooperative study, conference and mutual concessions before
beginning judicial proceedings.33 Having spent $6 million on
its failed lawsuit, Tarrant must now redouble its efforts to
negotiate a truce with its neighbors across the river and seek
a viable water supply solution for north-central Texas. Careful
negotiating of new compacts or amendments to existing
agreements may be the few avenues left to Tarrant to acquire
new water sources. The same can be said for all of the thirsty
states across our nation.

.
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Luke W. Davis graduated in May 2013,
cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan School
of Law. During law school, Davis took
several classes from Professor Gabriel
Eckstein, including Water Law. Davis also
helped Eckstein on independent research
assignments regarding groundwater
resources. Following his passion for
water, Davis hopes to pursue a legal career focusing on water
rights and issues.
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